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EXPLORING THE CHANGING INSTITUTIONS OF EARLY STAGE FINANCE 
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ABSTRACT 
Since the end of the shakeout following the bursting of the dot com bubble, we have seen 
substantial innovation in the institutions and organizational arrangements used to finance early 
stage high growth technology companies.  This paper will document the emergence of business 
accelerators, angel groups, micro venture capital funds, and online equity crowdfunding platforms, 
and show the rapid growth in angel investing over this period.  It will also document the 
corresponding movement away from traditional venture capital activity at the early stage of 
company development.   The paper will explain how technological advance, specifically the 
decline in the cost of bringing a new software product to market, has driven this shift in the 
institutions of early stage finance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the dot com boom, the institutions for financing high growth technology 
companies have changed dramatically.  Prior to 2002, new high potential companies in technology-
intensive industries typically received financing from a handful of individual angel investors – 
people who invest their own money in private companies owned and operated by others who are 
neither their friends nor family members – who were geographically proximate to them, followed 
by money from venture capital firms – investment funds that seek investment from investors 
needing long term returns, such as pension funds and university endowments.   
Since 2001, however, the institutions of early stage finance have changed substantially. 
Innovation in software and computing has lowered the cost of bringing new software projects to 
the market. These changes have given rise to the emergence of new early-stage finance institutions. 
The fraction of the population that invests in early stage companies has increased. The magnitude 
of the average investment has declined.  Angels have invested further afield from their locations.  
Four institutions in the world of financing high-potential early stage companies have either started 
or grown: angel groups, business accelerators, micro venture capital funds, and equity 
crowdfunding platforms.   
This paper focuses on chronicling these significant institutional changes in detail, but also 
offers some speculative explanations for how these phenomena relate to theories of institutional 
change. Technological change, particularly the dramatic decline in the cost of bringing new 
software products to market, has undermined the traditional venture capital model, which has 
shrunk substantially since 2001.  It has also led to the growth of angel investment activity, and 
innovations in the institutions of early stage finance described above. While other trends – the 
generation of great wealth among angel investors in Silicon Valley and legal changes that made 
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equity crowdfunding possible, and declining cost of capital  – also occurred during this period, a 
careful look at the data suggests that the decline in the cost of bringing new products to market 
was the primary source of the changes seen in the market for early stage finance.   
This article proceeds as follows:  The next section describes fundamental changes in the 
process of bringing new software products to market and explained how these changes have altered 
the institutions of early stage venture finance.  The third section describes how these new 
institutions, in turn, have altered the venture capital industry.  The fourth section describes how 
these changes have altered the angel capital market.  The fifth section concludes. 
 
THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN SOFTWARE INNOVATION ON EARLY STAGE 
FINANCE 
To understand the way that the system for financing early stage high-potential companies 
has changed since the start of the new millennium, we need to look at the way that innovation has 
changed in the primary industry that these investors fund.  Since the early 1980s, investors have 
put more money early stage high potential software companies than businesses in any other 
industry (CVR, 2015; NVCA, 2016).  Because software companies have historically received such 
a large share of the investments and investment dollars in early stage finance, changes to the 
process of software innovation cannot help but to influence the process of financing new early 
stage companies.  
The process of developing new software products has changed profoundly since 2001.  
Two of these changes – the dramatic decline in the cost of bringing a new software product to 
market and the tremendous rise in the capability of software to automate many very-difficult-to-
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measure-activities and to connect disparate people has dramatically changed the world of financing 
early stage companies1.  I deal with each of these changes in turn. 
Back in the late 1980s it cost more than $20 million in today’s dollars to bring a new 
software product to market (Lambert, 2016).  Companies needed to spend heavily on infrastructure 
to develop their new products and to market and sell the product to customers (Suster, 2012).  With 
this capital-intensive model of innovation, start-ups raised money by going to traditional venture 
capital firms in places like Sand Hill Road and pitched their business ideas to them (McClure, 
2014).    
 
The Rise of Angel Groups 
Over time, the cost of bringing new software products to market dropped systematically, 
falling to about $5 million at the time of the dot com bubble bursting in 2001 (Lambert, 2016).   
This decline in the cost of software development made it possible for angel investors to begin to 
compete directly with venture capitalists as a source of financing of early stage software 
companies.  While individuals angels could not provide the kind of capital necessary to finance 
early young software companies on their own, by working with other investors, individual angels 
could begin to reach the levels of financing necessary to finance the initial round of money needed 
by software start-ups.  As a result, the early 2000s witnessed a period of rapid rise of angel groups 
– collectives of accredited investors meet on a regular basis to hear entrepreneur’s pitches for 
funding and often conduct due diligence and invest collectively. 
                                                 
1 This was not the case in other growing industries such as biotechnology where the cost of bringing a 
product to market has remained relatively high (Di Masi and Grabowski, 2007; Stewart, Allison and 
Johnson, 2003). 
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Lerner and Schoar (2016: 3) explain that “Beginning in the mid-1990s, angels began 
forming groups to collectively evaluate and invest in entrepreneurial ventures.”  But angel group 
numbers did not begin to take off until the start of the current millennium.  Data from the Angel 
Capital Association, the trade association for angel groups, shows that in 1999, there were fewer 
than 100 American angel groups. By 2013, that amount had more than tripled, to 385 (Hudson, 
2014). 
 
The Birth of Business Accelerators 
The declining cost of bringing new software products to market in the 1990s was only the 
beginning of the process of cost reduction.  Between 2000 and 2004, the cost of developing new 
software products continued to decline.  Salesforce.com introduced the process of delivering 
enterprise applications over the Internet. Amazon Web Services began in 2002, and open source 
software began to drive down the cost of developing new software products.  On the marketing 
side, the formation and growth of Google in internet search, SMS technology on mobile phones, 
and PayPal in payments, led to further cost reduction.   By 2004, the cost of bringing a software 
product to market had shrunk to about $3 million (Lambert, 2016).   
The decline in the cost of bringing new software products to market also began further 
strain the traditional venture capital model.  Traditional venture capital firms cannot provide a lot 
of assistance and mentoring to more than a handful of start-up company founders. Traditional 
venture capital firms do not invest in large numbers of companies.  Moreover, much of the time of 
venture capitalists is spent monitoring their investments and sitting on boards.  Traditional VCs 
could not easily provide hands on assistance to a lot of software startups.   
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This shrinking cost of bringing software to market led some forward-looking folks to 
introduce a new innovation in the market place, the business accelerator, which began with the 
formation of Y Combinator in 2005. Accelerators are organizations that provide early stage 
companies with mentoring, capital and access to investors in return for an equity.   
Since 2005 accelerators have become one of the most rapidly growing institutions in early 
stage finance.  AngelList, an online platform that matches high potential startups with investors 
and employees currently indicates 578 accelerators in operation, up from one in 2005. As 
Hathaway (2015) explains, the number of accelerators began to rise rapidly in 2007 and expanding 
until about 2014.   
 
Figure 1: United States Accelerator Pool by Year 
 
Source: Hathaway (2016) 
 
The Emergence of Micro Venture Capitalists 
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The cost of bringing new software products to market has continued to fall over time, 
declining to about $1 million in 2010 (Lambert, 2016).  According to Suster (2011), open source 
computing, horizontal computing and Amazon web services drove down computing and operating 
costs by about 90 percent since 2001 (Suster, 2011).  The notable innovations in software 
development that have reduced the cost of bringing new software products to market include Ruby 
on Rails, open source software that was introduced in 2004.  Also beginning in 2006, Amazon 
made it possible for small companies and individuals to rent computers to run their own 
applications.   
Costs also began to fall on the marketing and distribution side of the equation.  Facebook 
began in 2004, YouTube in 2005, and Twitter started in 2006.  All of these new companies 
dramatically reduced the cost of reaching customers. As Jim Goetz, a partner at Sequoia Capital 
mentions: “….today start-ups have the App Store and Google Play, which allow them to touch 3 
billion consumers. For the first time in the  mobile ecosystem, you can reach half the planet without 
building a distribution system” (Harvard Business Review, 2016). 
The opportunity to reach customers on mobile devices also emerged in this period. Smart 
phones began to be sold in significant numbers in 2007, with Apple’s introduction of the iPhone.  
The declining amount of capital required to build and bring new companies to market led to a 
dramatic rise in the number of people who were willing to try to start software companies 
(McClure, 2014).  The increase in the number of businesses experimenting with minimum viable 
products and business models made it more difficult for investors to engage in the process of 
selecting new companies to back.  At this very early stage in the life of a company, the ability to 
differentiate winners from losers is nearly impossible. These investors needed to make a 
philosophical shift in their process of managing uncertainty.  Rather than trying to identify 
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winners, they began to think that massive diversification was the only solution. They would invest 
small amounts of money in a large number of companies and then invest further in those that 
showed traction (McClure, 2014).   
When companies need $100,000 to $200,000 to test a product idea, the traditional venture 
capital model breaks down.  Traditional venture capital is too labor intensive for fundraising efforts 
of less than $1 million, let alone for the less than $250,000 first financing rounds that had become 
common for software start-ups.   Traditional VCs are structured to make a handful of several-
million-dollar investments every year.  Their transaction costs are too high; they raise too much 
money; and they have processes that are too labor intensive to invest tiny amounts in a large 
number of companies.   
As a result, a new innovation in the financing process, micro venture capital funds, began 
to emerge around 2008.  These are limited partnerships that raise money from their own investors 
that then make $100,000 to $200,000 investments in early stage companies (Suster, 2011).  To 
operate effectively making a large number of small investors, these entities needed to change the 
venture capital process.  These investors began to routinize activities, positing that customized 
term sheets and sitting on boards was too cumbersome for the new type of early investment in 
start-up companies.  They also changed how they approached due diligence, leaving many 
questions about downstream activities unanswered until later and began to use data to select 
ventures and set valuations. 
The number of micro venture capital firms – funds that raise money from limited partners 
to invest small amounts of money in a large number of very early stage companies – have grown 
dramatically in recent years.  From fewer than 50 funds in 2011, the numbers swelled to nearly 
250 by 2015. 
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Figure 2: Number of Active Micro Venture Capital Firms 
 
Source: Samir Kaji, https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/past-present-future-micro-vc/ 
 
The introduction of micro venture capital funds to the venture capital mix has had a 
dramatic effect on the composition of venture capital funds.  Since 2007 has the size of the average 
venture capital fund declined significantly when measured in inflation adjusted terms as tiny funds 
were added into the pool with mega funds.   
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Source: Created from data from the National Venture Capital Association 
 
The Growth of Online Platforms 
Advances in software continued to change the world of venture finance after 2010.  The 
cost of bringing a new software product to market continued to decline.  By 2014, the cost was 
estimated to be as low as $200,000, and by 2016 this cost had fallen to around $100,000 (Lambert, 
2016) with further expansion of open source computing, horizontal computing and Amazon web 
services on the development side and lower cost search, social networking and media advances 
(e.g., Instagram and Snapchat) on the marketing and distribution side (McClure, 2014).   
As the volume of start-ups seeking tiny amounts of money at very early stages in their lives 
began to grow, other innovations became necessary. Of particular importance has been the post 
2010 introduction of online tools to facilitate investment in young companies. Different platforms 
– Gust, AngelList, Seedinvest, Crowdfunder, Wefunder, CircleUp, CB Insights, Crunchbase, and 
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Pitchbook – began to emerge to overcome several obstacles in making tiny investments by large 
numbers of people in very early stage businesses.  
Some innovations, like AngelList, made it possible to bring together investors very quickly 
and to provide the back office process of managing investments.  AngelList is a marketplace that 
allows the buyers (angels) and sellers (startups) to come together.  It facilitates introductions, 
saving on the time spent setting up meetings and traveling to pitch sessions, as well as syndicating 
deals and managing the process of making investments, reducing legal and organizing costs 
(Wilson, 2014).  
Other platforms, like Gust, Pitchbook, CB Insights and Crunchbase allow more 
quantitative approaches to early stage investing by providing access to data about valuations, 
company traction, and investment management (McClure, 2014).   Gust, for instance, provides the 
back-end collaboration tools needed to invest at large scale, while Pitchbook and CB Insights 
provide information about trends in valuation and exits. 
Still other platforms like in FundersClub, CircleUp, and SeedInvest provide individual 
investors with access to deal flow unimaginable in 2001.  Beginning with the Jumpstart our Jobs 
Act in 2010, early stage investors could learn about companies seeking financing on websites 
devoted to this purpose.  As a result, finding out about deals was no longer a local operation.  
Massolution (2015), for instance, estimates that global equity crowdfunding has jumped from just 
$400 million in 2013 to $2.6 billion in 2105.  
 
CHANGES IN VENTURE CAPITAL SINCE 2001 
The institutional change in the market for early stage finance described above has changed 
the venture capital industry in three significant ways.  First, the venture capital industry has shrunk 
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in size.  Second, traditional venture capitalists have moved later in the start-up lifecycle, with a 
large number of early stage investors and a small number of very large late stage investors.  Third, 
the industry has become increasingly concentrated in the one region where the traditional model 
remains strong – Silicon Valley. 
 
The Industry has shrunk  
Venture capital activity has shrunk since the end of the dot com boom in 2001.  One 
measure of this decline is the number of venture capital firms.   Fewer active venture capital firms 
exist now than in 2001 and fewer of those firms are actively raising funds.   As Figure 4 shows, 
between 2001 and 2015, the number of active venture capital firms decreased from 1852 to 1224, 
a decrease of more than one third.  Similarly, the number of venture capital firms raising a new 
fund in the previous eight years had fallen from 923 in 2001 to 798 in 2015, data from the National 
Venture Capital Association indicates.  The number of venture capital professionals decreased 
from 14,777 in 2003 to 5,891 in 2013 (Cook, 2014). 
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Source: Created from data from the National Venture Capital Association 
 
Another measure is capital under management.  Venture capitalists are managing 
substantially less capital than they did in 2001. The figure below shows the amount of capital 
venture capital firms have under management measured in inflation-adjusted terms.  In 2001 the 
amount of capital under VC management was $319 billion (in 2008 dollars).  By 2014, it had 
declined to $142 billion (in 2008 dollars).   Both for venture capital funds and capital under 
management, 2006 appears to be the point at which substantial decline began. 
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Source: Created from data from the National Venture Capital Association 
 
The Industry has moved to Later Stage 
Traditional venture capital firms have moved away from investments at the earliest stages 
in the life of companies.  In 2008, 12.8 percent of venture capital investments occurred at the seed 
and start-up stage.  By 2015, that fraction had fallen to 4.2 percent.  In 2001, venture capital firms 
put $1.1 billion (in 2015 dollars) into 282 seed or start-up stage deals.  In 2015, they put $1 billion 
into 186 companies, a nine percent decline in dollars and a 34 percent decrease in the number of 
companies backed. 
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Source: Created from data from the National Venture Capital Association 
 
CHANGES IN ANGEL INVESTING SINCE 2001 
Angel investing has changed substantially since 2001. In contrast to what has happened in 
venture capital, angel investment activity – efforts by individuals to finance private companies 
owned and operated by people who are neither their friends nor their relatives – has grown.  
Moreover, angel investment activity has become less geographically concentrated now that it has 
moved online to a sizable extent.  
 
Angel Investment Activity has Grown 
In contrast to the decline in venture capital activity in recent years, angel investment 
activity has increased substantially.  Since 2002, a period in which the number of venture capital 
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firms shrank by one-third, the number of angel investors has risen by 52 percent, data from the 
Center for Venture Research at the University of New Hampshire (CVR) reveals. 
Moreover, angel investment activity has increased relative to the stock of businesses and 
people in the economy.  Figure 8 compares CVR data with data from the U.S. Census Bureau on 
the number of U.S. businesses with employees to provide a measure the trend in the rate of angel 
investment activity in the economy since 2002.  As the figure shows, the change is substantial.   In 
2013, there were 13.99 angel-backed businesses per thousand employers, nearly double the ratio 
of 7.27 in 2002. 
 
Source: Created from data from the Center for Venture Research and Census Bureau 
 
Unfortunately, the data on the number of employer businesses isn’t available for more 
recent years than 2013.  But we can compare the number of angel investors to the population to 
get a different measure of the rate of angel investment activity. Figure 9 shows that comparison.   
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As the figure reveals, in 2015 the “active angel” fraction of the U.S. population was 36 percent 
higher than it was in 2002.   
 
 
Source: Created from data from the Center for Venture Research and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
As would not be surprising from the above discussion in trends in both angel investment 
and venture capital activity, angel investment activity has increased relative to venture capital.  In 
2002, there were 13.3 angel-backed companies for every venture capital-financed business in the 
United States, a comparison of NVCA and CVR data show.  By 2015, that ratio was 19.2.  
Similarly, in 2002 there were 108.9 active angels for every venture capital fund in operation.  In 
2015, there were 249.1 active angels per VC fund. 
In short, since 2002, angel investment activity in the United States has risen, both in terms 
of the number of angel investors and the number of companies they finance.  Moreover, angel 
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investment activity has increased relative to venture capital activity, which has declined over the 
same period. 
 
Angel Investments in Start-up Companies Have Become Smaller 
While the amount of angel investment activity has increased since 2002, the size of the 
average angel company raise has shrunk. Data from the CVR show that the average angel-backed 
company received 42.3 percent less money in 2014 than in 2002, when measured in inflation-
adjusted terms.  In 2002, the average angel-backed venture received nearly $576,000 in angel 
money (when measured in 2014 dollars).  But in 2014, the average angel-financed business 
received only $328,000.   
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This decline in funding comes from two sources.  First, the average amount invested per 
angel today is nearly 27 percent smaller than it was in 2002, when measured in inflation adjusted 
terms.  Second, the number of active angels per angel-backed company has also declined, falling 
from 5.6 to 4.3 between 2002 and 2014.   
 
Angel Investment Has Become Less Geographically Concentrated 
Historically, one of the rules of thumb about early stage investment is that they invest in 
companies no more than a two hour drive from their location. Investing locally, the theory holds, 
provides better information about entrepreneurs and facilitates the monitoring of portfolio 
companies.   
That rule of thumb has been changing. The Angel Capital Association (ACA) reports that 
accredited angel investors are more willing to invest in geographically distant start-ups than they 
once were.  The March 2015 ACA Member Group Survey of 106 angel groups revealed that less 
than 13 percent of groups preferred to invest in start-ups located within a two hour drive of their 
homes.  In 2008, that fraction was nearly 28 percent.      
One reason for this shift is the rise of online platforms.  A Comparison of the number of 
angels who are members of ACA-listed angel groups and the number of angels on online platforms 
such as SeedInvest and AngelList indicates that the number of angels on each of the platforms now 
exceeds the total membership of all ACA-affiliated angel groups.  While being a member of an 
angel group and being on an online platform are not mutually exclusive, the numbers indicate that 
online platforms are a key way that many angels are now finding deals. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
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Four new institutional arrangements have emerged or have grown in the world of early 
stage venture finance: angel groups, business accelerators, equity crowd-funding platforms and 
micro-venture capital funds.  As these new institutions have emerged, we have seen a subtle 
rotation in the world of early stage finance.  Traditional venture capital has declined, while angel 
investment activity has increased.  This section considers how economic theories for institutional 
change might account for these new arrangements. 
  One might view the market for early stage finance as a case study in institutional change.  
Institutional change involves alteration of the “rules of the game in a society” (North, 1990).   A 
shift in production technology – the declining cost of developing new software products – has led 
to shifts in the institutional arrangements of early-stage finance in ways consistent with economic 
theories that depict technological change as a key driver of institutional change (e.g. Nelson 2005; 
Kingston and Cabellero 2009; Ayres 1944).  The shift appears to have occurred in software and 
information technology and not in biomedical side of early-stage finance.  In addition, the timing 
of the shift appears to be more the result of technological change than a shift in attitudes or a 
decline in the cost of capital.   
Technical changes can affect institutions by changing transactions in early-stage finance. 
For example, the automation of investment activities in micro venture capital significantly reduced 
measurement costs in the valuation and selection of new ventures (Barzel, 1982). What was once 
unquantifiable has become more quantifiable, leading to new and more efficient institutional 
arrangements, such as crowdsourcing platforms, that economize on the costs of cognition. 
Furthermore, the emergence of information technologies has reduced search, negotiation and 
enforcement costs involved in connecting geographically dispersed agents and investors in early-
stage finance.  The declining cost of software development has reduced the capital needs of early 
22 
 
stage software companies, and has made large venture capital institutions inefficient for handling 
very early-stage start-ups.  As a result, these entities have shifted to making later stage investments. 
Changes in production technology have also reduced the costs of particular market-making 
activities, such as acquiring information about the valuation of very early start-ups. As a result, 
they support new investment management strategies (e.g. equity crowdfunding platforms’ making 
very small investments in a large number of very early-stage start-ups). (Ahlers et al, 2015; Casson 
1982).  These technological developments reduced the obstacles to market-making at every stage: 
contact-making between investor and start-up entrepreneurs; specification of the “deal”; 
negotiation (by providing benchmarks for similar early-stage finance transactions); monitoring and 
so on.   
The changes in information technology and institutional arrangements have together 
lowered information costs, increased capital mobility and allowed investors to spread risk through 
greater portfolio diversification. In turn, these changes have led investors and entrepreneurs to 
adopt new financial instruments, such as Structured Agreements for Future Equity (SAFEs) and 
convertible notes (North, 1990). 
Both institutional evolution and processes of deliberate design appear to be present in these 
institutional changes. A large literature views institutional change as an evolutionary process 
(Kingston and Caballero, 2009).   The emergence of new institutions has been largely self-
generating and bottom-up (Stringham, 2002), as entrepreneurs and investors have pursued 
profitable opportunities through the processes of variation, selection, and retention (Nelson, 2005).  
The new institutions of angel groups, business accelerators, micro VC funds, and online 
crowdsourcing platforms have largely emerged spontaneously through trial-and-error processes, 
have proved successful and profitable and that have spread by imitation and replication.  
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However, the demarcation between spontaneous and deliberately designed institutional 
formation is not clear-cut.  Individual actors consciously designed and created the rule systems 
that constitute online equity crowdfunding platforms and accelerators (Ahlers et al, 2015; Guenther 
et al, forthcoming), but once established, a spontaneous network of connections among investors 
and startups emerged and coalesced around these deliberately designed rule systems.  
The paper also illustrates the speed of adjustment of institutional change in finance 
markets. New institutions have emerged in a short timeframe – less than a decade.  The low degree 
of asset specificity involved in venture financing may account for the fast speed of response to 
parametric changes software development costs (Hodgson, 2015). Financial markets are very 
supple at generating new governance arrangements and institutional structures. They did not get 
stuck in a “sub-optimal equilibrium”, nor did they require legislation or political entrepreneurship 
to adapt to new circumstances.  
  This paper has offered a detailed case study of changes in institutional structure within 
modern capitalism. It illustrates the mutual interactions between economic actors and institutional 
structure.  However, much about this topic remains unexplored. Future research would do well to 
better identify co-evolutionary processes between institutions in early-stage financing and new 
technology, describing the pathways through which the four institutional changes feed back into 
or stimulate other technological changes.  Similarly, future research should examine how informal 
rules, social norms, conventions, and organizational routines might have changed in early-stage 
financing.  Identifying the sources of inertia among established large venture capitalists and path-
dependence in the processes would also be valuable. Finally, future work should also explore the 
extent to which the four main institutional changes are contingent upon the existence of an 
effective public legal framework that protects private property and enforces contracts and the 
24 
 
significance of legal changes (such as the Jump Start Our Start Ups Act 2010) relative to other 
changes. 
  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The period since the end of the dot com boom has been one of tremendous innovation in 
markets for early stage finance. Four new institutional arrangements have emerged or have grown 
in the world of early stage venture finance: angel groups, business accelerators, equity crowd-
funding platforms and micro-venture capital funds.  As these new institutions have emerged, we 
have seen a subtle rotation in the world of early stage finance.  Traditional venture capital has 
declined, while angel investment activity has increased.  Ever so subtly the balance of investment 
dollars has moved from big institutional funds that invest money raised from university 
endowments, insurance companies and pension funds towards dollars invested directly by 
individual angel investors. 
While the generation of wealth from previous generations of entrepreneurs played a role in 
this transformation, as did regulatory changes such as the Jump Start Our Startups Act, those 
changes were more of complementary shifts to a more fundamental technological change.  As 
Suster (2011) McClure (2014), Lambert (2016) and others have pointed out, the massive decline 
in the cost of bringing a new software product to market – from $20 million in the mid-1980s to 
about $100,000 today – has made it virtually impossible for traditional venture capital firms to 
fund very early stage companies.  Moreover, the increase in the number of people seeking to start 
high-potential companies that has resulted from this decrease in the cost of bringing new products 
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to market has created a need for investors to make a very large number of small investments in 
very young companies.    
Making large numbers of small investments in very early stage companies is facilitated by 
a shift at the margin from traditional venture capitalists who make large bets slowly to angel 
investors who make small bets more quickly (Simeonov, 2011).  It has also been facilitated by the 
development of four new institutional arrangements in early stage venture finance – angel groups, 
business accelerators, micro venture capital funds, and online platforms.   
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